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Abstract 
This paper analyses rural conflict in one of the most volatile areas of interwar 
Europe, the latifundia regions of the South of Spain. The historical and economics 
literature argues that rural conflict was a bottom-up, spontaneous response of 
landless peasants to unemployment, bad harvests, land ownership inequality, 
changes in property rights, and the lack of enforcement of pro-worker legislation. 
A second generation of historical studies has focused on democratization and 
concomitant changes in collective bargaining and labor market institutions. Was 
conflict caused by structural factors like poverty, inequality or unemployment or 
was conflict an endogenous response to political change? This paper analyzes the 
pattern of conflict in in three Andalusian provinces (Córdoba, Jaén and Seville) in 
the early 1930s to argue that the timing and geographical distribution of conflict 
is consistent with a wave of mobilization linked to greater political opportunities 
favored by lower repression, pro-worker institutional change, and labor market 
intervention.  Time-series and cross-sectional variation in levels of rural conflict 
suggest conflict was not a spontaneous response to dismal living standards and 
inequality. Rather, it emerged in large, fast growing towns of Andalusia and was 
mediated by the strategic interaction of authorities and experienced rural unions. 
The instances of rural conflict analyzed here suggest it is very difficult for new 
democratic governments in agrarian societies to stave rural conflict off with 
labor-friendly intervention. It is often argued that conflict precedes political and 
institutional change, but it is shown here that conflict can emerge abruptly as a 
response to those changes.   
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     ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses rural conflict in one of the most volatile areas of interwar Europe, 
the latifundia regions of the South of Spain. The historical and economics literature 
argues that rural conflict was a bottom-up, spontaneous response of landless peasants 
to unemployment, bad harvests, land ownership inequality, changes in property rights, 
and the lack of enforcement of pro-worker legislation. A second generation of 
historical studies has focused on democratization and concomitant changes in 
collective bargaining and labor market institutions. Was conflict caused by structural 
factors like poverty, inequality or unemployment or was conflict an endogenous 
response to political change? This paper analyzes the pattern of conflict in in three 
Andalusian provinces (Córdoba, Jaén and Seville) in the early 1930s to argue that the 
timing and geographical distribution of conflict is consistent with a wave of 
mobilization linked to greater political opportunities favored by lower repression, pro-
worker institutional change, and labor market intervention.  Time-series and cross-
sectional variation in levels of rural conflict suggest conflict was not a spontaneous 
response to dismal living standards and inequality. Rather, it emerged in large, fast 
growing towns of Andalusia and was mediated by the strategic interaction of 
authorities and experienced rural unions. The instances of rural conflict analyzed here 
suggest it is very difficult for new democratic goverments in agrarian societies to 
stave rural conflict off with labor-friendly intervention. It is often argued that conflict 
precedes political and institutional change, but it is shown here that conflict can 
emerge abruptly as a response to those changes.   
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1. Introduction 
Historical narratives on the causes of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) root the 
causes of the war in the escalation of conflict and violence that marked the Second 
Republic (1931-1936).  One of the motivations of the land reform law of 1932 was 
mitigating the potential revolutionary threat of landless laborers. In European history, 
rural unrest or open peasant rebellion have been linked to revolution and civil war, 
especially when peasant mobilization revolves around the issue of land ownership 
(Skocpol, 1979: 112; Moore, 1967; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Hegemonic 
accounts of political transitions have considered democratic and popular threats to 
landowning elites as the main cause of authoritarian reaction and democratic 
breakdown in interwar Europe (Gerschenkron, 1943; Luebbert, 1991).  
 
 During the Second Republic, Spain witnessed one of the fastest processes of 
peasant mobilization in interwar Europe. In 1931-1932, peasants represented between 
a third and a half of the booming membership of the anarcho-syndicalist National 
Confederation of Labor (henceforth, CNT) and the socialist General Workers’ Union 
(henceforth, UGT) from near zero membership levels in the late 1920s. In addition, 
striker rates in 1933 peaked to one of the highest levels in interwar Europe, with rural 
workers representing about a third of strikers. The whole period is infamous by the 
unprecedented levels of violence, with anarchist rural riots in 1931, 1932, or 1933, 
episodes of land seizures in 1933 and 1936 and tragic clashes between rebels and the 
police. As the most prominent historian of agrain conflict in 1930s Spain pithily put 
it, there was “latent and spontaneous Civil War in the countryside” during the 2nd 
Republic (Malefakis, 1970: 306). 
   
 3
 Mainstream narratives of the causes of rural conflict in 1930s Spain have 
focused especially on the South of Spain, where inequality, landlessness and poverty 
were endemic. There, it is argued, conflict was particularly acrimonious given the 
privileged position of the landowning elites pitted against a mass of desperately poor, 
illiterate landless laborers. Classic accounts of rural unrest in interwar Europe depict 
inequal power relations and exploitation by the owners of land as the pre-conditions 
for rural polarization and conflict. An exogenous shock like the First World War or 
the Great Depression brought such an unstable system to conflict and collapse (for 
example, Snowden, 1986: 33-34; Snowden, 1989: 150-57). In the case of Spain, 
employers’ boycott practices, poor wheat harvests and a reduction in agricultural 
output caused unemployment and falling living standards, resulting in conflict and 
polarization. 
 
 However, narratives emphasizing explotation and falling living standards do 
not square with the existing evidence: inequality fell quickly in the period (Prados de 
la Escosura, 2008), poor wheat harvests in 1931 and 1933 alternated with 
exceptionally good harvests in 1932 and 1934, olive-growing areas also experienced 
high levels of conflict and did not experience similar levels of output volatility, 
seasonal unemployment was not a new phenomenon in rural labor markets in dry-
farming areas of Spain, and real wages in agricultural labor markets held up pretty 
well in the 1930s (Domenech, 2013). This paper aims at subverting mainstream  
narratives of rural conflict during the 2nd Republic by analyzing in detail the pattern of 
conflicts in Andalusia, concentrating on the very active provinces of Córdoba, Jaén 
and Seville (see map 1).  
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 I approach the problem of rural conflict in Spain from a regional perspective 
because official, aggregate data on conflict are incomplete and biased for the period. 
The paucity of evidence has led several historians to try to reconstruct detailed local 
or micro-regional histories of protest (among other examples, Mintz, 1994; del Rey, 
2008). However, this strategy, while providing a privileged microscopic view of the 
deployment of local collective action, is prone to large selection biases. In general, 
towns are selected because conflict was more intense there than in other towns or 
because the town was special for other reasons. In order to avoid selection biases, this 
paper takes the middle way of a detailed macro-regional perspective, allowing me to 
go beyond the special cases while keeping the necessary details about conflicts and 
their context.   
 
INSERT MAP 1 
 
 Using a new panel data set of local rural conflict in three provinces of the 
South of Spain, I exploit the local distribution of conflict and its timing to identify the 
factors driving rural conflict during the Second Republic. My explanation stresses the 
“political opportunities” window (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Goodwin, 
2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 2011; Tilly, 1964, 1986) in which the focus is in the 
interplay between actors, the state and local and national political institutions. The 
main conclusion of the paper is that the pattern of conflict analyzed here is consistent 
with “polity process” explanations and not with “grievance-based” explanations. In 
1930s Spain, like in other studies of peasant rebellion, peasant conflict was obviously 
affected by inequality and poverty, but did not closely correlate with these variables 
(Rudé and Hobsbawm, 1973; Markoff, 1996).  Conflict was linked instead to the 
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existence of active labor markets of rural laborers, previous collective action, access 
to markets and information and proximity to large urban centres. Results found here 
would be consistent with narratives of conflict escalation linked to drastic political 
and institutional changes, the wane of repression, and the promotion of collective 
bargaining. The explosion of rural conflicts, especially strikes, was almost inevitable 
and did not require substantial changes in relative prices or in living standards. The 
intensity of collective misery did not explain explosive rural conflict in 1930s Spain. 
 
 Almost 40 years ago, in an ambitious comparative research project on 
democratic breakdown in the 20th century, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan stressed the 
preeminence of political factors and processes over structural and economic factors to 
explain polarization and ultimate breakdown of democratic regimes in interwar 
Europe and Latin America (Linz, 1978; Linz and Stepan, 1994; see as well Payne, 
1972). Linz’s superb and still unsurpassed analysis of political elites’ strategic 
decisions during the Second Republic left, however, one open question: through what 
mechanisms do elites’ decisions translate into non-elite mobilization and polarization? 
(Linz, 1994). This paper is a modest attempt to open a new research agenda on the 
determinants of bottom-up participation in collective action in 1930s Spain. 
 
 
2. Literature review  
The economics of conflict and violence hypothesize a bottom-up, spontaneous 
response to conflict, paying little attention to the collective organization of conflict. 
Thus Paul Collier argues that the motivation of individuals to participate in conflict 
depends on the opportunity cost of violence, which in turn is determined by incomes 
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coming from peaceful, private activities (Collier, 2009: 133). When incomes are low, 
or falling, or unemployment is on the rise, the motivation to engage in protest or 
violence increases (Do and Iyer, 2010: 735).  
 
 More recently, in the relatively recent turn to find plausible sources of 
exogenous variation in income, volatile rainfall and harvests have been linked to rural 
conflict. Thus for example, a recent article by Hidalgo, Richardson and Naidu (2010) 
argues poor harvests caused by rainfall shocks increased the likelihood of land 
invasions in Brazil. An even more extreme version of this hypothesis, Miguel et al. 
claim negative rainfall shocks increased the likelihood of civil wars in Africa (Miguel 
et al., 2004). In countries like Rwanda, Malthusian pressures and increasing 
competition for land led to social crisis and violence (André and Platteau, 1998). In 
many violent places of the developing world, the existence of a large pool of 
unemployed workers has been considered a typical trigger of conflict (a critical view 
in Berman, Felter, Shapiro, 2011). 
 
 Mainstream narratives of the evolution of rural conflict in the Second 
Republic in Spain have emphasized spontaneous processes of mobilization caused by 
poverty, unemployment and inequality. Thus for example Paul Preston argued 
“agrarian violence was a constant feature of the Republic” and that “based on the 
crippling poverty of rural laborers, it was kept at boiling point by the CNT” (Preston, 
2006: 55). In his view, “throughout 1932, the FNTT (Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Tierra, National Federation of Agricultural Workers) worked hard 
to contain the growing desperation of the rank and file” (Preston, 2006: 57). Helen 
Graham, considered “the thwarting of popular aspirations for social change produced 
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disillusion (…) among the landless poor and unemployed of the rural south 
exasperated by the durability of the old relations of power (Graham, 2005: 14). 
Similarly, Stanley Payne argued that in the spring of 1934, “the most active role in 
labor affairs was taken by the UGT’s farmworker federation, the FNTT, centered in 
Extremadura and Andalusia.” FNTT strength was explained by the fact that “whereas 
conditions for urban workers had deteriorated only slightly, there was a growing sense 
of desperation among rural laborers, who had suffered an increase in more than 50 per 
cent in unemployment during the past two years”(Payne, 2006: 60-61).  
 
Some have argued unemployment responded to mechanization and the 
intensification of production methods, but James Simpson’s calculations showed 
labor supply did not outstrip labor demand in Andalusia in the period 1886-1935, 
especially because agricultural land increased faster than population in the period and 
mechanization was slow (Simpson, 1992: 16). But Carmona and Simpson (2003) 
focused on changes in the demand for different types of workers with agrarian 
development in the early 20th century, with (slow) mechanization and output 
expansion favoring workers with permanent contracts, tenants, and the gangs of 
temporary migrants at the expense of the local pool of casual laborers (Carmona and 
Simpson, 2003: 112-13). In addition, short run changes in labor demand were perhaps 
more important. The casual proletariat did not have ways of diversifying away the 
risk of poor harvests and struggled with seasonal income variation (Brenan, 2008: 
120). If the harvest was poor, labor demand fell and greater underemployment or 
unemployment followed. Unemployed laborers did not have access to financial 
services to smooth income shocks and there were more restrictions to temporary 
migrations in the 1930s (Domenech, 2013).   
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 Another set of explanations for conflict single out the role of diffuse property 
rights. Typically in the New Institutional Economics vein, diffuse property rights 
cause the rise of conflict, which happens when property rights to land and land reform 
clash, typically when different groups have competing claims to the land (Alston, 
Harris, Mueller, 2012; André and Platteau, 1998).  In other cases, disputes over usage 
of common land can lead to violence (Villarreal, 2004). In this view, conflict is more 
typical of isolated and rugged areas in which the state is weak because it is more 
difficult to enforce the rule of law and contracts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Herreros 
and Criado, 2009). 
 
 In the case of Spain, it is natural to think that the Land Reform law of 1932, 
the most ambitious legislative piece of the period, must have led to the spread of 
conflict in areas with large estates. For example, 42 per cent of all the area of the 
province of Seville and a third of the province of Córdoba was earmarked for 
confiscation (Pascual Cevallos, 1983: 33; López Ontiveros and Mata, 1993: 35). 
Julián Casanovas writes “the owners’ resistance to Republican legislation intensified 
conflict. This hostility could be seen to be particularly acrimonious in areas with large 
estates” (Casanova, 2010: 49).  
 
 Sociologists and political scientists have argued that frustration-aggression 
theories of conflict lack predictive power (Béteille, 1979: 188). Inequality, 
unemployment and underemployment, crises, and exploitation are the norm, not the 
exception, in most developing countries and in historical societies, yet conflict only 
erupts in very special historical circumstances. Several theorists have stressed the role 
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of expectations and contagion in large social processes, given the obvious non-
linearity of most aggregate social processes (Biggs, 2002, 2005; Freeman, 1998). In 
this framework, small changes in material conditions or in political opportunities can 
lead to large changes in collective participation.    
  
Because collective action is difficult and mobilization is rare, authors like Eric 
Wolf or Theda Skocpol have stressed the importance of organizations and their 
capacity for autonomous collective action (Wolf, 1999: 115). In some cases, 
autonomy appears out of historical accident, as it is for example the case when there 
are institutions that govern common resources (Skocpol, 1979: 116). The more solid 
the networks of solidarity among the peasants, the easier it is to organize collective 
action. Although landowners traditionally controlled the administration of most of the 
towns in the areas studied here before the 1930s (Tusell, 1976: 330-1), there is indeed 
some evident vibrancy in the history of collective action in some areas of Andalusia 
(Carrión, 1975: 57-59). In his classic book, Juan Díaz del Moral studied the spread of 
anarchism in the last quarter of the 19th century and the upheavals of the early 1870s, 
early 1890s and the early 1900s that preceded the so-called Bolshevik triennium of 
1918-1920 (Díaz del Moral 1973). Carmona and Simpson (2003) stress moral hazard 
and problems of asymmetric information associated with Andalusian rural workers’ 
militancy (Carmona and Simpson, 2003: 110-11). 
 
The role of changing expectations and the role of local leaders in organizing 
collective action appears especially in detailed micro accounts of town life like 
Collier (1987) and Fraser (2010), in regional studies like Montañés (1997) on Cádiz 
and by del Rey (2008) or by Lisón Tolosana (1983) outside Andalusia. The story is 
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not one of exploitation and resistance, but of empowerment, changing expectations, 
and large changes in the social organization of labor and land markets, especially in 
towns controlled by the Spanish Socialist Party and the UGT (Collier, 1987: 15). 
These historical contributions focus on the drastic political changes associated with 
democratization and its effects on the mobilization and polarization of opposing 
interest groups (Shubert, 1990: 101; Tébar Hurtado, 2006: 22). Detailed studies by 
Cobo Romero (1992) and Grupo de Estudios Agrarios (1995) stress the radical 
overturn in relations of power, especially where Socialist mayors got elected 
(Macarro Vera, 2000: 62). Although overactive mayors could be suspended of their 
duties by prefects, in April 1933 there was a Socialist mayor in 18 per cent of towns 
in Seville, 32 per cent of towns in Córdoba, and 35 per cent of towns in Jaén (PSOE, 
AH-24-6, 29 August 1934: 8). According to this hypothesis, mobilization and conflict 
were highest where Socialist militants led peasants to confrontation, the mobilization 
of landowners, and polarization. Rather than stressing rank-and-file mobilization, in 
this view, institutional change and democratization sparked conflict top-down from 
the political parties and unions to the peasants. 
 
However, a study by Enrique Montañés (1997) on the province of Cádiz, 
where Socialists were weak and anarchism strong, also describes a similar overturn in 
power relations and stresses collective bargaining and the conflicts associated with it. 
In the main agricultural towns of the province of Seville and Córdoba, anarcho-
syndicalism was the norm and remained active until 1934 despite selective repression 
since the summer of 1931. Socialists were particularly powerful in Jaén and in the 
sierra towns of Córdoba, whereas the CNT controlled most of the large agro-towns of 
the Guadalquivir plain.  
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But perhaps ideological differences have been overstretched, especially 
because unions and their leaders have produced the main historical sources. As 
Montañés (1997) has shown, despite the revolutionary roots of anarcho-syndicalism, 
day-to-day collective action in towns controlled by the CNT was closer to bread-and-
butter unionism focussing on wages and hours, the preference of local workers over 
temporary migrants, the abrogation of piece rates and the enforcement of collective 
contracts. Contemporary observers like journalist Manuel Chaves Nogales noted the 
blurred ideological preferences of rural laborers in the province of Seville, stressing 
their combination of anarchist, radical republican and communist ideas (Chaves 
Nogales, 2012: 35-37). Emphasis on Socialist dynamism perhaps does not do justice 
to the diverse nature of social movements in the South of Spain. 
 
3. Data 
This paper follows Bernal (1974) in attempting to provide the most complete to date 
mapping of conflict in Andalusia (Bernal, 1974: 139-88). Although rural conflict did 
not only intensify in Andalusia, the poor quality of official strike data in the 1930s 
forces me to concentrate on one region to assemble the necessary evidence from 
miscellaneous sources. I focus on Andalusia because it is in this area where the effect 
of latifundia on conflict and polarization has been singled out as the most intense. In 
fact, conflict became closely associated with the region studied here. Despite their 
specialization in agriculture, Jaén, Córdoba and Seville ranked 4th, 3rd and 7th of 50 
provinces by absolute number of strikers in 1933 (Boletín, VI, 60, 1935: 46-67).  
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 Moreover, focusing on these three provinces allows me to gather information 
on local patterns of land ownership. Because the government started the cadastre in 
provinces with large estates, quantitative evidence on land ownership distribution in 
1930s Spain only exists for some provinces, including the provinces studied here (Pro 
Ruiz, 1992: 308-316; Carrión, 1975 [1932]: 77). In the case of Córdoba, Jaén and 
Seville, Pascual Carrión processed the detailed local information on landownership 
from the cadastre (Carrión, 1975). Additionally, the three provinces share some 
important characteristics like the specialisation in wheat and olives, a very seasonal 
demand for labour in rural labour markets, the presence of large estates in some areas 
(most prominently in the province of Seville and to a lesser extent in Córdoba and 
Jaén), and the importance of intra- and inter-provincial temporary migrations.  
 
 Because official data on strikes and conflict are poor or do not exist for the 
period, I rely like Bernal (1974) and Malefakis (1970), on non-official evidence, 
especially newspapers, and the historical literature. National newspapers devoted full 
sections to very detailed accounts of strikes and other conflicts in the provinces, as 
well as crimes and accidents of variegated nature. Moreover, this paper relies on 
decades of historical research in provincial archives and local newspapers. In 
addition, several national and provincial newspapers from the period are available on-
line. Accordingly, I have performed boolean searches have been used to identify 
episodes of conflict in the period and region studied.  
 
 Newspapers and miscellaneous qualitative evidence from the historiography 
have well-known biases and problems. However, when official data are poor, as in the 
case of 1930s Spain, several important contributions to the study of social movements 
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have relied on newspapers and qualitative information to illuminate various aspects of 
collective action (Earl et al., 2004: 66; Franzosi, 1987). Newspaper research has been 
instrumental in several path-breaking studies of protest and social movements such as 
the Tarrow (1989), McAdam (1982) or Tilly (1979, 1995).  
 
 However, in the case of newspapers, selection and description biases need to 
be taken seriously: censorship and government control is always an issue in countries 
with a short tradition of independent journalism. Moreover, newspapers selectively 
report events depending on their intrinsic interest to readers and probably ideological 
biases, which can distort the information given on the event (Earl et al., 2004: 67).  
 
 In this paper, I have tried to identify the conflict episodes in more than one 
source (not always possible) and have relied on sources of information that historians 
have identified as trustworthy. Moreover, I have used the available information in 
ways that minimize description biases. For example, I focus on the strict counting of 
events rather than on using information on outcomes or participation in the event wich 
could be subject to important inaccuracies. Strict event counts follow the strategy of 
Hobsbawm and Rudé (1973), Markoff (1985, 1986, 1996), Alston, Libecap and 
Mueller (2000), and, to a great extent, Hidalgo, Naidu and Richardson (2010). 
 
  However, one can argue that the number of events and the intensity of 
conflict are not necessarily highly correlated. In fact several authors stress that the 
intensity of conflict could be proxied by the proportion of participants in the conflict 
episode in the relevant population (for example the number of strikers in the overall 
labor force of a firm or a sector or the proportion of the local population involved in 
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land invasions) or the duration of the conflict (among others, Korpi and Shalev, 
1980).  
 
 Using participation has problems in itself, however. Firstly, one worries about 
measurement error, a serious problem in the kind of evidence used here. Secondly, 
participation could be endogenous to the success of the conflict event. Participation is 
generally measured at peak participation but peak participation is endogenous to the 
prior probability of success (for example people participate more when the probability 
of repression is low or when success looks possible). 
 
An oft-used second proxy for intensity is the duration of the conflict event. 
But duration is also poorly measured in the types of conflicts described here. 
Moreover, in most regression exercises with strike data, duration is negatively related 
to the probability of strikers’ success (Card and Olson, 1995: 49-50). Both 
measurement error and endogeneity problems recommend avoiding the use duration 
and participation in the measurement of the intensity of conflict.  
 
Finally, I do not take into account the outcome of the “conflict event”. In some 
cases, it is difficult to conclude that a certain episode ended in a victory or defeat of 
peasant and government officials might have reasons to alter the distribution of strike 
outcomes. The available evidence suggests workers victories dominated losses until 
1934 (FNTT, 2000: 205-6; AE, 1932-33: 650). This is not surprising: a study of 
prefects between 1931-1939 shows only 7 per cent of all prefects were military 
officers, whereas almost 60 per cent were school teachers, university professors, 
doctors and journalists in most cases associated with one of the Republican parties 
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(Serrallonga, 2007). Evidence from prefects shows that with the exception of the odd 
military prefect, prefects were generally sympathetic to the grievances of workers, 
although not necessarily tolerant of revolutionary anarcho-syndicalism (Aparicio 
Albiñana, 1936: 25-30; Martín Villodres, 1932: 44; Pascual Cevallos, 1983: 75, 89). 
The general strike of the summer of 1934 met however with very strong repression, 
arrests and the closing of union offices. Moreover, the anarchosyndicalists of the 
CNT, with links with revolutionary anarchism and refusing to participate state-
sponsored collective bargaining institutions, faced selective repression.  
 
The conflict dataset was culled from various sources. Firstly, we used the very 
detailed historical studies of Manuel Pérez Yruela (1979) on the province of Córdoba, 
the books of Francisco Cobo Romero (1992, 2003, 2007) on the province of Jaén and 
the study by Fernando Pascual Cevallos (1983) on the province of Seville. All of 
these studies give detailed accounts of rural conflict in the provinces studied here. 
Additionally, I read the section on conflicts in every single issue of El Sol from 1st 
April 1931 to 31st July 1934. Edward Malefakis considered El Sol to be the national 
newspaper that supplied the best information on local conflict (Malefakis, 1970: 304).  
Moreover, I undertook boolean searches for the concepts “huelga” AND 
“campesinos”, “huelga de campesinos”, “invasión”, “campesinos invaden”, “invasión 
de fincas rústicas” and several variations of these in the on-line archives of 
newspapers El Sol, ABC national edition, and ABC Seville edition.  I also performed 
the same boolean searches in the digital newspaper library of the Spanish Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sport which includes local newspapers from several 
provinces.i  
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I focus on the two instances of conflict that were the most common in the 
period. Firstly, I look at general strikes of peasants or farmers organized by peasant 
unions. For obvious reasons, this is not akin to counting the total number of peasant 
strikes, because it leaves out minor and isolated conflicts. However, it is difficult to 
find instances of “isolated” conflicts, either because they were relatively rare or they 
were not often reported.  
 
Secondly, I focus on threats to property rights related to recorded instances of 
land invasions and trespassing. The contemporary press did not doubt to refer to these 
episodes as “land invasions” or “invasions of estates” (“invasión de fincas rústicas”).  
However, despite the trespassing, the occasional violence, or episodes of machinery 
destruction and arson, I find the “land invasions” studied here qualitatively different 
from genuine land seizures, in which peasants spend more than just some hours in the 
property of an owner who does not welcome them. Because land invasions in the 
region studied here had more to do with picket lines and conflicts around the issue of 
who was hired and for how long, I decided to refer to these idiosyncratic land 
invasions “collective trespassing”, generally referring to episodes in which, against 
the will of the owner, a group of people clearly identified as peasants entered a estate 
to work, glean or damage the harvest or machinery. Arson and machinery destruction 
of reapers and threshers look almost negligible in the towns studied here (despite the 
contemporary hyperbole in mainstream newspapers): the very detailed study on the 
province of Seville by Pascual Cevallos (1983) could only locate 15 episodes of 
machinery destruction, giving a total of 27 mechanical reapers smashed or damaged 
from 1931 to 1936, or 1 per cent of the stock of mechanical reapers in the province 
((Pascual Cevallos, 1983: 137-138; Anuario Estadístico de las Producciones 
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Agrícolas, 1932: 320). Similarly, always according to Cevallos (1983), arson only 
surfaced in 11 towns in Seville from 1931 to 1936. Arson in Córdoba and Jaén was 
less important. 
 
I organize the database as a monthly panel of 196 towns followed for 39 
months from April 1931 to June 1934 (both months included) leading to 7644 usable 
observations. There are 248 towns for which I have collected information, but data on 
the distribution of land ownership in Carrión (1975 [1932]) are only available for 196 
(capital cities of Córdoba, Jaén and Seville and cities above 30’000 souls were 
excluded from the sample). Selection bias is therefore a problem, but either the 
cadastre was not finished for the missing 52 towns or Pascual Carrión was not able 
put together the distribution of landownership. In the data set, missing observations 
appear prominently in the case of Seville, because by the time Carrión wrote his study 
in the early 1930s, the cadastre in that province was not yet finished (Carrión, 1975: 
77). Missing observations correspond to towns where small and medium plots were 
the norm and therefore the cadastre could only be finished at great cost, like in the 
Aljarafe region in the province of Seville (the judicial districts of Seville and Sanlúcar 
la Mayor concentrate almost half of all the missing cases).  In the province of Seville, 
towns with missing information on land ownership have much smaller populations 
and areas on average than the rest of the province (for example the average land area 
of the towns with missing information was one tenth than the average of the rest of 
towns in Seville). Furhermore, on average, towns with missing land inequality data 
struck on average only about a third of the times compared to the rest of the province. 
This means that I might be underestimating any potential positive effect of land 
ownership inequality on conflict. 
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The dependent variable takes value 1 if there was at least a strike or collective 
trespassing event starting in town i in month t and takes value 0 if there was none. 
Conflict was unevenly distributed. In the case of rural strikes, between 30 to 40 per 
cent of towns only experienced one conflict episode between April 1931 and July 
1934. Clustering is more extreme when I consider “trespassing”. Table 1 shows the 
averages for the manifestations of conflict considered here: a sizable fraction of towns 
experienced zero or just one strike over 3 years and most towns did not record acts of 
collective trespassing. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
 
4. Types of conflict and outcomes 
Peasant strikes can be separated into two main groups: those taking place immediately 
before or during the harvest, generally over collective contracts, and conflicts in 
months outside the harvest, generally over the obligation of employers to employ 
unemployed workers. With respect to conflicts around the harvest time, happening 
around May-June for wheat and in November-December for olives, a large proportion 
of strikes occurred in the period in which collective contracts regulating the working 
conditions in the harvest were negotiated. In the case of Seville, Pascual Cevallos 
shows more than 90 per cent of conflicts took place around the main harvest periods 
(Pascual Cevallos, 1983: 100). The evidence for Jaén and Córdoba shows a greater 
share of strikes by unemployed workers. For example, in 1931-1932, 35 per cent of 
the strikes in the province of Jaén listed by the FNTT revolved around the issue of 
unemployment (“crisis de trabajo”) (FNTT, 2000: 205-6). 
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As for the demands of strikers, surprisingly, conflicts over wages or hours of 
work were not the most salient. There were serious disagreements about the payment 
of piece rates or time rates when the collective contracts for the olive-picking 
campaign were negotiated (Pérez Yruela, 1979: 137). Often, conflicts revolved 
around the issue of local labor exchanges and the list of employable workers, with 
strikers demanding the preferential hiring of local laborers at the expense of foreign 
workers (El Sol 9 July 1931; El Sol 11 November 1931). 
 
 Outside the harvest months, the management of employment concentrated a 
large proportion of conflicts. In the town of Rute in Córdoba, “several hundred 
workers, with wives and children, concentrated in front of the town hall to protest 
against unemployment” (Pérez Yruela, 1979: 122). In the summer of 1931, anarcho-
syndicalist unions led a series of strikes to insist on the preferential hiring of local 
workers over non-local inmigrants and demanding the hiring of household heads for 
several months after the end of the harvest season. To end the strike of Bujalance 
(Córdoba) in 1931, employers guaranteed employment for all local, male workers 
until the 15th of August and accepted employing more workers in shorter shifts until 
the end of October (Pérez Yruela, 1979: 126-7).  
 
With respect to land invasions, land seizures were rare in the provinces studied 
here. Large biases in the evidence are possible, but newspapers reported numerous 
cases of genuine land seizures in the neighboring province of Huelva or in the region 
of Extremadura. Often, land invasions in the provinces studied here occurred because 
picket lines entered the estates to clash with strikebreakers. In Arjona, laborers 
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“stormed” the cortijos (Cobo Romero, 2003: 252). In Mancha Real, marauding 
groups of strikers forced the “permanent” workers to go on strike (Cobo Romero, 
2003: 253). In the general strike of June 1934, conflicts between strikers and 
permanent cortijo workers were common (El Sol, 6 June 1934).  
 
In other cases, invasions responded to practices that contributed to the 
smoothing of income throughout the year, for example the compulsory hiring of 
unemployed workers mandated by mayors (“laboreo forzoso”) or the gleaning of 
olives at the end of the olive harvest (the so called “rebusca”).  During the 2nd 
Republic, the collective contract for the olive-picking season established the starting 
date of gleaning when a quarter of the olives had already been harvested. In fact, 
however, it was impossible to determine exactly when a quarter of the olives had been 
picked up (Aparicio Albiñana, 1936: 41). Workers, employers, mayors and prefects 
had different incentives to determine when gleaning could start.  Workers could use a 
mayor authorization to start gleaning without the permission of owners (Pérez Yruela, 
1979: 149). Prefects, especially in Jaén, struggled to control the workers and appease 
the landowners (Aparicio Albiñana, 1936: 25; Martín Villodres, 1932: 32-3). 
Interpretations also changed over time: in Jaén, in November 1931, restrictions on 
“rebusca” were lifted in the case of children and those older than 60 (El Sol, 25 
November 1931). Yet in January 1932, rebusca was banned (El Sol, 17 January 
1932). The practice of rebusca is behind several documented episodes of collective 
trespassing in Jaén. 
 
Actions revolving around the issue of the so-called compulsory cultivation 
were also surrounded by ambiguities. In order to deal with the problem of seasonal 
 21
unemployment, the Republican government passed a decree that allowed majors to 
place unemployed workers in large estates in those cases in which a technical 
committee concluded that land was not exploited intensively enough. But determining 
what constituted legitimate intensification was impossible and generated numerous 
problems of interpretation. Top down control was difficult: prefects insisted on using 
the provincial Commissions of Compulsory Cultivation, but these were overridden by 
local commissions and autonomous actions by groups of peasants (Pérez Yruela, 
1979: 140-41, 149). As in the case of gleaning, “compulsory cultivation” created 
many instances in which groups of laborers and employers clashed over unemployed 
workers’ right to work. 
 
5. Research design 
I estimate panel probit models in which the dependent variable depends on a series of 
time, cross-sectional, and time-series-cross-sectional interacted variables. The 
dependent variable in a first set of models is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if 
at least one general peasant strike was started in the town in a given month between 
April 1931 and June 1934 (both included) and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in 
the second set of models uses a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if there was a 
documented event of collective trespassing in the town in town i in month t. This 
yields a panel data set of 39 monthly observations for 196 towns.  
 
 I use as regressors a set of independent variables related to the economics and 
historical literature. I use dummies for month interacted with crop specialization 
dummies and year dummies to test the effect of bad harvests on conflict. Wheat and 
olive harvests were notoriously volatile in the South of Spain. Taking into account the 
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expansion of agricultural land from 1890 to 1935, the standard deviation of the output 
of wheat and olives was 23 per cent and 50 per cent of the mean respectively (AE, 
various years). Although wheat was less volatile than olives, wheat harvests were 
more volatile than olive harvests in the provinces studied here in the early 1930s, 
which allows for a straightforward comparison of conflict levels between towns 
specialising in cereals and those specialising in olives or other products. Compared 
with mean provincial wheat output for years in 1920-1933, wheat output in Seville 
was above mean in 1931, more than 2 standard deviations above mean in 1932 and 
1.15 standard deviations below mean in 1933. Taking into account wheat production 
in the provinces of Córdoba or Jaén, both 1931 and 1933 were bad years and 1932 a 
very good one (own calculations from AE, various years). Although disaggregated 
information on the 1934 wheat harvest is not available, the 1934 harvest was 
considered as good or better than the 1932 harvest.  
 
 The volatility of wheat harvests in the early 1930s allows me to test if poor 
harvests caused greater levels of conflict. In particular, interacted May and June 
dummies with 1931 and 1933 dummies should have significantly different 
coefficients, meaning June 1931 and June 1933 should have been more conflict-prone 
than June 1932 and June 1934. In principle, this coefficient should also be higher in 
the case of bad years in towns especializing in cereal production compared to towns 
specialized in other crops in the same bad years. Therefore, I would expect intereacted 
May and June dummies with year 1931 and year 1933 dummies and a dummy taking 
value 1 if the town was specialized in cereals to display positive coefficients 
statistically different from 0. Dummy variables capturing the type of local agricultural 
(irrigated, irrigated-dry farming, cereals, cereals and olives, olives) are interacted with 
 23
month- and year-dummies to identify the impact of volatile wheat harvests. The 
classification of crop-specialization is based on a coding of a detailed map of 
agricultural land uses in 1956 (this is before large investments in irrigation were made 
in the 1960s).ii 
 
 
 In addition, the landless local population should also be more prone to engage 
in collective action in bad years. I also use the log of the proportion of landless 
laborers in the whole of the poor peasant population (this is the total population of 
landless laborers, small tenants and small owners). This uses the work of Espinoza et 
al. (2004), who tabulated information from the 1933 Census of Peasants at the judicial 
district level (an administrative unit encompassing several towns). I expect a 
differentiated effect of the proportion of landless peasants among the local pool of 
poor peasants to have a bigger effect on conflict in bad years (1931 and 1933) than in 
good years (1932 and 1934). 
 
 The effect of insecure property rights is captured by the concetration of land 
ownership. I approximate variation in land tenure inequality by using the log of the 
percentage of agricultural land in each town taken up by estates over 250 hectares 
(from Carrión, 1975). Moreover, land tenure inequality also approximates the degree 
of employers’ ability to act collectively, with resistance to Republican laws more 
easily coordinated when there are fewer estates employing laborers.  
  
 Several extra time-invariant variables are included as independent variables. 
In order to capture the effect of land scarcity in the event of strikes or invasions I use 
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the log of population density and population growth between 1920 and 1930 (from 
Censo de Población, 1920, 1930). It would be far-fetched to compare the competition 
over scarce land with falling living standards and a Malthusian struggle for survival. 
In fact, mortality rates almost halved from 1920 to 1935 in the provinces studied here 
in a process of gradual, continuous decline (Movimiento Natural de la Población, 
1920-1935). Most probably, it would be wiser to consider those variables as proxies 
for the competition over rents coming from valuable land, as population would 
endogenously locate in the most fertile parts of the province (population growth and 
population density have a strong, statistically significant negative correlation with 
distance to the largest urban centre in the province). 
  
 I also add extra time-invariant variables capturing several dimensions related 
to the main hypotheses in the literature. Access to information and markets are 
proxied by the log of the linear distance between the town and the capital of the 
province, the log of the town’s elevation above the sea, a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the town had a train station and a dummy variable taking value 1 if the town 
was the main town in the judicial district.iii Finally, the impact of the previous history 
of collective action is captured by a dummy variable taking one if the town had a 
registered peasant union in 1916 (IRS, 1916). 
 
The regressions use several time-dummies capturing the changes in bargaining 
power over the agricultural year, time-effects, as well as the potential time-
dependence of the process studied here. Bargaining power fluctuated throughout the 
year, being at its highest in May-June and November-December, when collective 
contracts for the wheat and olive harvest were negotiated. With the wheat or olives 
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ripe for collection and with employers risking losing the harvests in storms or to frost, 
laborers bargaining power was highest. To proxy unobserved bargaining power, I use 
a set of monthly dummies.  
 
In addition, in order to deal with time- and state-dependence, I use a dummy 
variables taking value 1 if there was a conflict event in the past month, in the past 
three months and in the past six months. In addition, I also consider the cumulative 
number of events in the towns since April 1931. This considers all strikes had the 
same effect on the event in period t irrespective of how far apart they are from t.  
 
 Finally, in a third set of regressions, I look at the role of Socialist mayors in 
conflict using a sub-sample of towns in Seville and Córdoba for which I have 
information on Socialist mayors. In this case, I identify the effect of Socialist mayors 
by looking at closely contested elections in which Socialists won by a small majority. 
Moreover, I approach the polarizing effect of the electoral victory of the Centre-Right 
in November 1933 using the interaction of a dummy taking value 1 when the town 
had a Socialist electoral majority with a dummy taking value 1 in months after 
November 1933 and 0 in all the previous months. If the hypothesis of post-November 
1933 polarization holds, this variable should have a negative coefficient (in a 
regression in which I also have dummies for year). Admittedly, having a Socialist 
electoral majority in municipal elections is not exactly the same as having a Socialist 
mayor. But in most cases, Socialist electoral majorities must have led to Socialist 
mayors and, if that were not the case, the mayor would have been more sympathetic 
to labor interests.  
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 Model selection for the type of data used here is particularly tricky. In 
principle, one would want to account for unobserved heterogeneity and consequently 
use either a fixed-effects logit or a random-effects probit (Greene, 1993: 655). 
Reliance on several time-invariant explanatory variables makes the estimation of 
fixed-effects impossible. In random-effects probits, the assumption of no correlation 
between the random effect and observed explanatory variables is considered 
unappealing (Wawro, 2001: 567). A solution to this problem is Chamberlain’s 
“correlated random-effects estimator”, which assumes that the specific effect is 
correlated with all the leads and lags of the independent variables (Hsiao, 1986: 165). 
Because the data set relies heavily on time- invariant independent variables, this 
strategy would generate perfect multicollinearity among several variables. I am 
therefore forced to assume no correlation between the random effects and the 
independent variables. 
 
 A second important issue is the modelling of state dependence, with “state” 
defined as the realization of a stochastic process. Dependence in turn refers to the fact 
that the probability of observing the occurrence of one event depends on previous 
event occurrence. Part of state dependence is explained by unobservable variables, 
which affect the probability of observing one particular state or event. Without taking 
into account unobservables, the successive draws would look more correlated than 
they would be if unobserved heterogeneity was controlled for. “Spurious” state 
dependence can be dealt with using random effects. However, the use of fixed or 
random effects in time-series, cross-section data has been criticized if fixed- or 
random-effects absorb most of the interesting cross-sectional variance in the data 
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(Plümper, Troeger, Manow, 2005). For this reason, I display specifications excluding 
and including random effects. 
 
 True state-dependence means that successive draws might be correlated with 
one another. A typical solution is using lagged values of the dependent variable or 
more complex models with lagged values of the latent dependent variable behind the 
0, 1 realizations (Beck, Epstein, Jackman, O’Halloran, 2002: 2). However, it would 
still be necessary to model the first cross-section and then assume an autocorrelated 
structure between the observed event and past events (Heckman, 1981; Stewart, 
2007). I follow in this case the standard practice to deal with serial correlation in 
time-series cross-section data, using the lagged dependent variable as a regressor plus 
unit and period dummies  (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001). Because this 
“standard” has been subject to various criticisms, especially if the lags and time 
effects soak up interesting time series variation (Plümper, Troeger, Manow, 2005), I 
display specifications with and without lagged dependent variables. 
  
 In the case at hand, morever, it is perhaps ill-advised to model the first cross-
section with instrumental variables. Between April 1931 and June 1934, I am 
observing conflicts in a period sandwiched between two periods in wich peasant 
collective action was severely repressed. Therefore, the problem of left censoring 
typical in continuous surveys, when the observation of an ongoing dynamic system 
starts at one arbitrary point in time, is not a problem here as I collect data on 
behaviour in a new political regime in which unions and strikes are legal. In my case, 
unobserved time-invariant variables are going to affect initial probabilities of state 
realizations, but random-effects will capture those effects.  
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 Moreover, most of the literature on state dependence focusses on 0,1 
sequences in which long series of 0s are followed by long series of 1s. Typically, this 
puts most empirircal exercises closer to duration data analysis, for example in the case 
of state failure (Beck, Epstein, Jackman, 2002), transitions between non-employment 
and employment (Heckman, 1981) or export behavior of firms (Esteve-Pérez and 
Rodríguez, 2009). In the case studied here, however, I observe long sequences of 0s, 
punctuated by the occasional 1. The explanation for the landscape of 0s and 1s is that 
several months display very low levels of strike activity. The main solution adopted 
here for state and time dependence is considering previous realizations of the 
dependent variable and temporal dummy variables to allow for changes in the 
baseline probability. Apart from proxying for unobserved laborers’ bargaining power, 
the monthly dummy variables will in principle absorb the dependence of sequential 
conflicts.   
  
 With the hypotheses from the literature, I estimate the following panel probit 
models for the probability of observing a strike or invasion episode in town i in month 
t for all towns in the provinces of Córdoba, Jaén and Seville from April 1931 to July 
1934. 
 
[1] prob (rural strike=1) i, t = ß0 + ß1' ·Xi  + ß2' ·X i,t + ß3' ·X t + µ i,t 
[2] prob (rural strike=1) i, t = ß4 + ß5' · Xi  + ß6' ·X i,t + ß7' ·X t + ∂i + µ i,t 
[3] prob (collective trespassing =1) i, t = ß8 + ß9' ·Xi  + ß10' ·X i,t + ß11' ·X t  + µ i,t 
[4] prob (collective trespassing =1) i, t = ß12 + ß13' ·Xi  + ß14' ·X i,t + ß15' ·X t +∂i + µ i,t 
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where Xi is a set of time-invariant town characteristics that include: the log of the 
proportion of estates of more than 250 hectares in the total area of the town, the log of 
the proportion of landless laborers among the poor peasantry (at judicial district 
level), population growth between 1920 and 1930, the log of population density, the 
log of elevation above sea level, the log of the distance from the provincial capital, 
and dummies taking value 1 in towns that were was the main judicial center of the 
district (cabeza de partido judicial), that had a train station, or that reported a 
registered peasant union in 1916, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, I use a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the town displayed a Socialist electoral majority in the municipal 
elections of april-May 1931. I use a set of dummy variables that capture the type of 
local agriculture (control is irrigated and irrigated-dry farming agriculture, with a first 
dummy taking value 1 for cereal agriculture, a second taking value 1 for towns with a 
mixed specialization in cereals and olives, and a third dummy taking value 1 in olive-
specialized towns). Finally, I include two dummy variables for the province 
containing the town (control category is the province of Córdoba), in order to control 
for idyoncratic, unobserved provincial effects (for example, to take into account the 
unobserved strategies and preferences of the provincial prefects).  
 
 Xi,t includes the lagged realizations of the dependent variable in various forms 
(conflict in the previous month, in the previous three months, previous six months and 
the cumulative number of previous strikes since April 1931) and interactions of local 
characteristics (proportion landless, or crop specialization) with  month and year 
dummies. Among the local characteristics, I include a variable taking value 1 when 
there was a Socialist electoral majority, which I interact with a dummy variable taking 
value 0 before November 1933 and 1 thereafter. Finally, I also include interactions 
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between local crop especialization and monthly and year dummies to test hypotheses 
about the effect of bad harvests. 
 
 X t includes a set of time variables having to do with the month and year of 
each observation (January and 1931 are the ommitted groups).  Finally, µ i, t is the 
disturbance term and ∂i is the random effect.  
 
 Table 2 and table 3 give the mean and standard deviations of town and judicial 
district characteristics and the correlation matrix. Tables 4 and 5 give the coefficients 
and standard errors of regressions corresponding to models 1 to 4. In table 4, models 
[1] and [2] are pooled regressions without random effects, which respectively exclude 
and include lagged realizations of the dependent variables (only coefficients from the 
specifications using cumulative number of strikes are reported). Still in table 4, 
columns [3], [4] and [5] report the random effects probit regressions. Specification [3] 
is a random-effects probit which does not include lags of the dependent variable as 
regressors.  [4] and [5] add past realizations of the dependent variable and exclude 
and include month-year and crop-specialization dummies respectively. In the case of 
table 5, specifications [1] and [2] are population-averaged probits with and without 
lags of the dependent variable as regressors. Specifications [3] and [4] include random 
effects, interacted month, year and crop specialization dummies and lagged values of 
the dependent variable. In the case of regressions with “collective trespassing” 
presented in table 5, I was forced to exclude several monthly dummies and interacted 
variables because these predicted failure perfectly.  
  
 PLEASE INSERT TABLES 2, 3, 4, 5 HERE  
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 Using the coefficients from the probit regressions, I can analyse the various 
effects of harvests on collective protest calculating baseline probabilities and marginal 
effects. In the case of random effects models, I used the transformation of the 
estimated random effects probit coefficients to calculate baseline probabilities as 
indicated in Arulampalam (1999). It is noteworthy that the different specifications are 
well behaved, according to Wald tests of joint significance, and coefficients of the 
most important variables are consistent across the different specifications. In all 
models, likelihood-ratio tests suggest unobserved heterogeneity needs to be taken into 
account as unobserved heterogeneity contributes to a substantial fraction of total 
variance. 
 
 First of all, it is noteworthy how conflict clustered in the harvesting months, 
generally when collective contracts were negotiated before the harvest. Dummies for 
May, June, and July and October, November and December display positive and 
significant coefficients, with the largest effects in June and November. Using the 
estimated coefficients of specification [5] in table 4, Figure 1 shows the baseline 
probabilities associated with each month calculated for 1932 and all continuous 
variables at their means (the probabilities are calculated for a capital of judicial 
district in the province of Córdoba with a recorded union in 1916 and no train 
station). The graph shows how the baseline probability of local general strikes in June 
1932 was about 0.35.  This baseline probability doubles that of November 1932, and 
is about three times higher than probabilities in other months. Local workers struck 
when they had more bargaining power, not during the months of high seasonal 
unemployment when their bargaining power was low. Moreover, coefficients on the 
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regressions with “collective trespassing” also show invasions were more common in 
June, generally associated with picket lines in strikes, not during the planting season 
when land invasions would have made more sense.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
 When I look at the effects of bad harvests, the coefficients do not give support 
to the hypothesis that bad harvests caused greater levels of conflict. May and June 
1931, despite the fact that the 1931 wheat harvest was poor, did not display high 
levels of conflict. In fact, they had negative, significant coefficients in the regressions 
predicting strikes. Across all specifications, coefficients of the interacted month and 
year dummies suggest June 1933 was not significantly more conflict-prone than June 
1932 or June 1934, suggesting the size of the harvest was not associated with the 
propensity to strike or to invade. Finally, protest did not occur more often in bad years 
in towns specialized in cereals compared with towns specialized in other crops in the 
same bad years: the 1933 dummies interacted with the dummies for local crop 
specialization are not significant in specifications [1], [2] and [5] in table 4 and in all 
specifications in table 5.  
 
 Dummy variables for year might also capture yearly effects associated with 
the size of the harvest, among other unobserved variables associated with each of the 
calendar years. In this respect, results from regressions do not favour narratives 
emphasizing bad harvests. Dummies for 1932 and 1933 display large and positive 
coefficients, which are in most cases not significant. Only the coefficient on the 
dummy for 1934 is consistently significant across most specifications in the case of 
strikes.    
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 Vulnerability of households to poor harvests must have been greater in towns 
characterized by having a large proportion of landless laborers, but regressions throw 
mixed results: landlessness was correlated with greater propensity to strike in 1931, 
1932 and 1933, and not in 1934, moreover a greater proportion of landless laborers 
among the poor peasantry was negatively related to the propensity to invade, except in 
1934. In addition, the effect of landlessness was not distinctively higher in bad years 
than in good years in the case of strikes. Although, towns with a higher proportion of 
landless laborers clearly displayed a differentiated pattern of conflict (more strikes, 
fewer land invasions), the interacted landlessness-year variable shows this effect was 
activated by the harvest of 1931, but not by the bad harvest of 1933.   
 
 Moving to the effect of agrarian institutions, the impact of landownership 
inequality on conflict is not significant (and wrongly signed), both in the case of 
strikes and of collective trespassing. Land ownership inequality and landlessness are 
collinear, but when I exclude the log of the proportion of landless laborers, I get a 
negative and not significant coefficient on the proxy landownership, -0.04 with a 
standard error of 0.07. The lack of significance of the coefficient on land ownership 
inequality strongly suggests threats to the property rights of owners of large estates 
were not a trigger of conflict. In addition, employers’ collective action did not affect 
their workers’ proclivity to strike or invade.  
 
 Perhaps a proxy for unobserved locational advantages or for competition for 
scarce land, population density was in general not correlated with greater levels of 
conflict. Only in the case of regressions with strikes as the dependent variable, one 
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specification throws a positive, significant coefficient, while in the other cases 
coefficients are statistically non-significant. Capturing a similar effect, population 
growth between 1920 and 1930 in the strike regressions had positive and significant 
effects, but not in the invasion regressions. In the case of strikes, the effect of 
population growth is substantial: the probability of a strike in June 1932 would 
increase 13 % with a standard deviation increase in population, for a town in Córdoba 
with the continuous variables at their means, with a recorded union presence in 1916, 
no train station and main city of judicial district. It is important to note as well that 
population growth was strongly positively correlated with the proportion of landless 
laborers, population density and negatively correlated with distance from large urban 
centers and elevation. The insignificance of population density persists when I 
exclude population growth in alternative specifications (in unreported regressions). 
 
 Perhaps a proxy for the proximity government officials, being the main 
administrative unit of the area (cabeza de partido judicial) had a distinct effect on the 
probability of striking and trespassing. With all variables at their means, the 
probability of starting a strike in June 1932 in the representative town in Córdoba 
more than doubles if the town was the main administrative town of the district 
compared to a town with the same characteristics that was not the administrative 
center of the district (from a probability of 0.19 to 0.39). The probability of reported 
trespassing episodes also increases, with the same exercise multiplying the baseline 
probability by 3. 
 
 Similarly, towns that were more integrated with national markets seem to be 
more prone to conflict. Adding a train station to the representative town in the 
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province of Córdoba in June 1932 increased the baseline probability by 31 per cent. 
Moreover, the log of the distance to the capital of the province displayed negative and 
statistically significant coefficients in almost all specifications with strikes as the 
dependent variable (and insignificant coefficients in the case of the regressions taking 
into account invasions). Capturing the proximity to markets and large urban centres, a 
one standard deviation decline in the distance to the largest urban center in the 
province increased the probability of strikes in the representative town in June 1932 
by 66 per cent.   
 
 In order to test the hypothesis that autonomous organization and the previous 
history of collective action matter, I evaluate the impact of previous union 
organization using the records of existing peasant unions in 1916, some years before 
the repression of peasant unions intensified in 1920. A comparison of my 
representative town in Córdoba in June 1932 with a union in 1916 with the same town 
not reporting union presence in 1916 yields an increase of the baseline probability of 
a strike of 50 per cent. The existence of a union in 1916, however, is not relevant for 
the probability of trespassing by groups of rural workers. That said, the presence of a 
union in 1916 could be endogenously relateed to the persistence of exploitative 
agrarian institutions. However, union presence in 1916 is neither explained by 
landownership inequality, nor by the proportion of landless laborers. As in the case of 
conflict, distance to large urban centers, access to markets and being an administrative 
center are the strongest predictors of union presence in 1916.  
 
 Finally, I look at the serial correlation of sequential conflicts. It is important to 
note that the dummy variables conflict in the last 3 and 6 months did not dispel 
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statistically significant coefficients. But when I look at the accumulated experience of 
conflicts in the Second Republic, regressions with strikes and with invasions offer 
very different results. In the case of strikes, the number of previous strikes sharply 
reduces the probability of observing a strike in any moment of time. Rather 
inconsistently, however, previous invasions increased the probability of observing 
more invasions. In the case of strikes, perhaps the negative effects of previous strikes 
have to do with the greater repression of Anarcho-syndicalist unions after 1932. On 
the contrary, perhaps the control over labor markets by the union was more difficult 
over time making it more likely that picket lines entered the fields. The law of 
municipal boundaries was more flexibly interpreted as the costs of the ban on 
temporary migrations were increasingly apparent (Domenech, 2013).  
  
 Finally, I analyze the impact of “Socialist mayors” on the levels of rural 
conflict, understood by the literature as a polarizing force. There are two potential 
hypotheses to be considered, which are not altogether compatible: the first is that 
Socialist mayors pushed ahead with the ambitious Republican legislation and faced 
the fierce resistence of employers and landowners, leading to greater levels of 
conflict. A second hypothesis is that Socialist-dominated town councils started to feel 
the repression after November 1933 when the Centre-Left lost the general election. 
The evidence shows Socialist mayors were increasingly suspended after November 
1933 (when the government was taken by the Rightist Republicans), with growing 
intensity in 1934 until the peasant general strike of June (Carmona Obrero, 2002: 151-
157; Payne, 2006: 62; Salazar Alonso, 1935: 75-77). 
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 I perform the same regressions as in (1) but now including a dummy variable 
in those towns in which the Socialists had an electoral majority. Because quantitative 
information on the municipal elections of April and May 1931 is not easy to come by, 
I was forced to use subsamples of municipal elections in Córdoba and in Seville (only 
May elections were available) (Seville: Gómez Salvago, 1986: 133-34; Córdoba: La 
Voz, 14th April 1931, 15th April 1931, 1st June 1931, 2nd June 1931, 4th June 1931; 
ABC, 14th April 1931, pp. 31-32).  
 
 Testing for the impact of municipal socialism is however difficult, as local 
Socialist power is obviously correlated with the militancy of local workers and would 
lead to overestimating the impact of Socialist mayors on conflict. Therefore, I also 
present results of a matched sample of elections in which Socialists won or lost by a 
small margin. Because there were few elections around the 50 % discontinuity, I was 
forced to use an ampler definition of closely contested elections (taking into account 
towns in which there was a share of the elected representatives from the Spanish 
Socialist party from 30 to 70 per cent).  
 
 INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
  
 Table 6 shows the coefficients of the probit regressions with the Socialist 
electoral majority as an explanatory variable. When I use all the towns in which I 
have information on the election outcome, the coefficient is positive, as expected, but 
not statistically significant in the case of strikes and negative, non-significant in the 
case of collective trespassing. The interacted variable capturing the effect of the loss 
of local power after November 1933 on conflict has a positive coefficient in both 
cases, as expected according to the historical literature, but it is not statistically 
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significant. In addition, the sample of closely contested elections suggests using the 
sample that considers all elections overestimates the impact of municipal socialism on 
strikes. For example, I get a negative and now significant coefficient in the case of 
strikes. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that municipal Socialism did not explain 
strike levels (and also collective trespassing levels). 
 
9. Conclusions 
In development economics, opportunity cost and grievance theories have become the 
predominant approach to study conflict in developing societies. This paper studies 
one of the most intense and destabilizing processes of peasant mobilization and 
conflict in interwar Europe. For the 1930s, it is considered rural conflict was 
particularly acromonious in areas with unequal distribution of land ownership, in light 
with an interpretation of Spanish modern history that puts large estates and the 
unequal distribution of land as one of the main obstacles of political and economic 
modernization.  
 
 In this paper, however, I show that “ecological” correlations using regional or 
provincial means disappear once I exploit local variation in the amount of local land 
held by large estates. Moreover, conflict in 1930s Andalusia has been associated with 
the poverty and exploitation of landless laborers, especially those living in towns 
specializing in wheat and/or olives, who remained unemployed for several months in 
the year. Yet, I show conflict clustered in fast growing towns, which were close to 
large urban centres and were integrated into national agricultural markets. Local 
Socialist power did not matter for the latter, as many of the most vibrant towns in 
Seville or Córdoba displayed a historical preference for anarcho-syndicalism or 
 39
radical republicanism and did not elect Socialist mayors. Clusters of agrarian 
development and thick labor markets explain the vitality of protest, part of a large 
change in expectations and in bargaining power. The testimonies of several prefects 
of the period show that despite the occasional bouts of repression against anarcho-
syndicalist leaders, central authorities until June 1934 favored collective bargaining. 
State support to collective bargaining led to a wave of strikes, which was not 
correlated with any possible proxy of living standards, specialization or variation in 
income. Workers in some towns protested more possibly because they had a longer 
experience of strategic interaction with authorities. State intervention to stem riots and 
rebellions in the large agro-towns of the South Spain had been going on since 19th 
century and it had been a natural step to negotiate working conditions with provincial 
prefects or the Ministry of Labor. Most of this protest clustered in well-integrated and 
fast-growing towns in which various social groups competed for rents from 
agricultural development. 
 
The results found here perhaps erradicate several myths about social relations 
in Andalusia in the 1930s. Seasonal unemployment was a characteristic of rural labor 
markets in cereal growing areas of Spain, not a new phenomenon in the 1930s. 
Poverty and living standards were dismal in the 1930s, but the situation did not 
deteriorate markedly in the early 1930s due to bad harvests or employers’ sabotage. 
There was a profound change in social relations and in the governance of rural labor 
markets, but nothing equivalent to a “latent” civil war caused by unemployment, 
inequality and exploitation. In fact, violence, boycott and sabotage would be 
incompatible with the very abundant harvests of 1932 and 1934. Perhaps, only the 
fundamental political regime change of April 1931, pro-labor legislative change, and 
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weaking of employers’ bargaining power explain rural conflict in this part of Spain in 
the early 1930s. 
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Table 1 
Strikes and land invasions in Córdoba, Jaén and Seville, April 1931 to July 1934 
Strikes Means S. D. Max Min % towns with 0 or 1 strike 
All  1.996 1.936 9 0 38 % 
Córdoba 2 2.061 9 0 44 % 
Jaén 2.096 2.011 9 0 41 % 
Seville 1.9 1.78 8 0 31 % 
 Collective Trespassing Means S. D. Max Min % with 0 recorded trespassing 
All 0.25 0.637 4 0 82 % 
Córdoba 0.29 0.716 4 0 80 % 
Jaén 0.151 0.465 3 0 88 % 
Seville 0.307 0.703 4 0 78 % 
Source: own calculations using Andalusian conflict database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of town characteristics: 
Variables Mean  SD 
Log (% estates >250 hec) 3.395 0.851 
Log (proportion landless) 4.301 0.173 
Log (distance) 3.895 0.703 
Log (elevation above sea level) 5.699 1.019 
Log (population density) -0.541 0.89 
Population growth 1920-1930 16.35 16.25 
Train station =1 0.366 0.483 
Capital judicial district =1 0.134 0.342 
Peasant union in 1916 =1 0.384 0.487 
Sources:  See text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix, town characteristics. 
 Log (% large estates) 
Log (prop 
landless) 
Log 
(distance) 
Log 
(elevation) 
Log (pop 
density) 
Log(prop landless) 0.204*     
Log (distance) -0.079 -0.145*    
Log (elevation) -0.255* -0.567* 0.6*   
Log (popdensity) -0.393* 0.152* -0.391* -0.222*  
Popgrowth, 1920-1930 -0.017 0.069 -0.238* -0.238* 0.282* 
Notes: * significantly different from 0 at 5 % level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of local strikes, April 1931-July 1934. Panel probit models.  
 POPULATION 
AVERAGED 
Robust  Robust RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
     
VARIABLES [1] 
COEFF 
STD 
ERORR 
[2] 
COEFF 
STD 
ERROR 
[3] 
UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD 
ERORR 
[4] 
UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD 
ERROR 
[5] 
UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR 
CONSTANT -6.36*** 1.989 -6.459*** 2.073 -6.159*** 1.904 -5.644*** 2.431 -5.578** 2.456 
Log (% large estates) -0.041 0.044 -0.044 0.048 -0.04 0.047 -0.05 0.071 -0.053 0.071 
Pop growth, 1920-1930 0.005** 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.009** 0.004 0.009** 0.004 
Log (pop density) 0.078 0.048 0.088* 0.053 0.08 0.055 0.127 0.081 0.126 0.082 
Log (elevation) 0.052 0.075 0.063 0.083 0.042 0.071 0.041 0.088 0.04 0.089 
Capital district=1 0.4*** 0.086 0.442*** 0.104 0.423*** 0.089 0.667*** 0.15 0.67*** 0.151 
Log (distance) -0.165 0.073 -0.187** 0.085 -0.162*** 0.076 -0.244** 0.113 -0.243** 0.116 
Train station = 1 0.115 0.076 0.125 0.085 0.133* 0.078 0.204* 0.116 0.21* 0.118 
Union in 1916=1 0.198** 0.076 0.21** 0.083 0.206** 0.073 0.278** 0.111 0.281** 0.112 
Cereals  0.043 0.157 0.034 0.173 0.052 0.157 0.011 0.237 0.004 0.238 
Cereals and olives -0.013 0.159 -0.018 0.177 -0.025 0.147 -0.074 0.324 -0.08 0.225 
Olives  -0.077 0.168 -0.091 0.186 -0.073 0.159 -0.141 0.242 -0.141 0.242 
Dummy Jaén 0.176* 0.096 0.166 0.106 0.187* 0.104 0.116 0.14 0.115 0.142 
Dummy Seville 0.073 0.111 0.077 0.123 0.056 0.11 0.026 0.161 0.027 0.163 
Log (proplandless) 1.076** 0.458 1.103 0.479 1.01** 0.424 0.897* 0.543 0.872 0.547 
Log(proplandless)*1932 -0.573 0.462 -0.526 0.468 -0.612 0.44 -0.456 0.463 -0.427 0.466 
Log(proplandless)*1933 -0.584 0.434 -0.525 0.441 -0.585 0.43 -0.263 0.456 -0.279 0.457 
Log(proplandless)*1934 -1.133 0.498 -1.062 0.498 -1.18** 0.514 -0.946* 0.535 -0.906 0.54 
Cumulative strikes    -0.041* 0.025   -0.197*** 0.049 -0.197*** 0.05 
Dummy February 0.002 0.192 0.001 0.188 0.009 0.194 -0.03 0.196 0.02 0.201 
Dummy March 0.276 0.163 0.27 0.16 0.298 0.175 0.274* 0.177 0.324* 0.181 
Dummy April -0.1 0.157 -0.097 0.154 -0.091 0.185 -0.121 0.188 -0.072 0.193 
Dummy May 0.608*** 0.165 0.603*** 0.161 0.647*** 0.178 0.683** 0.178 0.712** 0.185 
Dummy June 1.422*** 0.168 1.417*** 0.165 1.49*** 0.161 1.564*** 0.163 1.604*** 0.169 
Dummy July 0.342** 0.166 0.35** 0.164 0.378** 0.174 0.449** 0.179 0.498** 0.183 
Dummy August -0.048 0.163 -0.036 0.161 -0.033 0.195 0.018 0.201 0.065 0.205 
Dummy September 0.232 0.164 0.244 0.161 0.258 0.178 0.333** 0.184 0.382 0.188 
Dummy October 0.479** 0.161 0.494** 0.157 0.523 0.169 0.649** 0.176 0.699** 0.181 
Dummy November 0.679*** 0.217 0.686*** 0.214 0.736 0.206 0.843*** 0.212 0.897*** 0.217 
Dummy December 0.317* 0.179 0.34* 0.175 0.357 0.173 0.519** 0.182 0.569** 0.187 
Dummy 1932 2.171 2.022 2.01 2.046 2.329 1.907 1.876 2.001 1.745 2.013 
Dummy 1933 2.316 1.912 2.136 1.936 2.314 1.864 1.313* 1.96 1.382 1.968 
Dummy 1934 4.589** 2.165 4.384** 2.16 4.795** 2.223 4.339* 2.298 4.163* 2.319 
May*1931 dummy -0.642*** 0.229 -0.64 0.229 -0.658** 0.243 -0.726** 0.259 -0.708** 0.261 
June * 1931 dummy -1.913*** 0.298 -1.906 0.299 -1.978*** 0.314 -2.114*** 0.338 -2.109*** 0.338 
May * 1933 dummy 0.141 0.181 0.138 0.179 0.149 0.207 0.125 0.197 0.114 0.257 
June * 1933 dummy 0.182 0.146 0.176 0.144 0.198 0.164 0.156 0.157 0.106 0.2 
May 1933 cereals 0.044 0.308 0.04 0.307     0.052 0.279 
June 1933 cereals -0.130 0.23 -0.125 0.229     0.081 0.21 
November*1931dummy 0.077 0.191 0.091 0.191 0.074 0.213 0.149 0.221 0.148 0.222 
November*1933dummy 0.041 0.221 0.044 0.22 0.039 0.217 0.055 0.222 0.05 0.223 
Panel level variance 
component 
    -2.483  -1.104  -1.079  
Standard deviation     0.29  0.576  0.583  
Proportion of total 
variance contributed by 
the panel level component 
(rho) 
    0.077  0.25  0.254  
Likelihood ratio test of 
rho=0 
Chi-squared 
    25.32***  26.62***  26.81***  
N 7643  7643  7643  7643  7643  
Wald Chi squared 576.22***  592.03***  415.85***  392.38***  384.43***  
Log Likelihood     -1345.88  -1356.66  -1339.39  
*** significantly different from 0 at the 1 % level; ** significantly different from 0 at the 5 % level; * significantly different from 0 at the 10 % level. 
Robust standard errors clustered by towns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Determinants of “collective” trespassing, 1931-1934. Panel probit models. 
 POPULATION 
AVERAGED 
Robust  Robust RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
   
VARIABLES [1] 
COEFF 
STD ERROR [2] 
COEFF 
STD ERROR [3] 
UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR [4] 
UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR 
CONSTANT 4.179 3.822 1.497 3.342 6.157 4.73 5.542 4.458 
Log (% large estates) -0.142* 0.085 0.049 0.069 -0.129 0.104 -0.13 0.097 
Population growth, 1920-1930 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.005 
Log (population density) -0.045 0.091 0.036 0.092 -0.039 0.126 -0.057 0.12 
Log (elevation) -0.036 0.136 0.05 0.104 -0.023 0.135 -0.044 0.125 
Capital judicial district=1 0.539*** 0.187 0.233** 0.114 0.59*** 0.18 0.424** 0.181 
Log (distance) 0.043 0.157 0.061 0.11 0.1 0.17 0.138 0.159 
Train station = 1 -0.053 0.161 -0.089 0.157 -0.04 0.171 -0.06 0.161 
Previous union in 1916=1 0.052 0.167 0.009 0.111 0.075 0.157 0.054 0.147 
Cereals 0.325 0.283 -0.057 0.198 0.356 0.353 0.368 0.326 
Cereals and olives 0.118 0.333 -0.211 0.202 0.146 0.335 0.157 0.31 
Olives 0.133 0.319 -0.051 0.186 0.165 0.355 0.2 0.334 
Dummy Jaén -0.176 0.242 0.189 0.154 -0.321 0.208 -0.293 0.197 
Dummy Seville 0.352 0.227 0.395 0.192 0.369 0.255 0.404 0.242 
Log (proplandless) -1.57* 0.866 -1.112 0.777 -2.14** 1.09 -2.048** 1.025 
Log(prop landless)*1932 -0.032 0.777 0.107 0.843 -0.094 1.036 -0.223 0.989 
Log(proplandless)*1933 1.459 0.949 1.973 1.402 1.618 1.096 1.316 1.061 
Log(proplandless)*1934 2.419* 1.251 3.298 2.416 2.721* 1.456 2.367* 1.417 
Cumulative number of invasions   0.874*** 0.093   0.106** 0.048 
Dummy February -0.024 0.227 -0.044 0.313 -0.021 0.291 -0.022 0.288 
Dummy March         
Dummy April -0.539 0.388 -0.64 0.496 -0.573 0.392 -0.52 0.384 
Dummy May -0.045 0.288 -0.096 0.343 -0.037 0.325 -0.146 0.316 
Dummy June 0.601*** 0.223 0.629 0.275 0.712** 0.256 0.541** 0.248 
Dummy July -0.288 0.334 -0.585 0.425 -0.3 0.347 -0.269 0.347 
Dummy August -0.264 0.249 -0.494 0.376 -0.303 0.348 -0.264 0.346 
Dummy September         
Dummy October 0.11 0.276 -0.109 0.328 0.164 0.279 0.21 0.275 
Dummy November 0.101 0.311 -0.158 0.372 0.294 0.267 0.049 0.342 
Dummy December 0.079 0.305 -0.255 0.367 0.092 0.284 0.104 0.284 
Dummy 1932 0.447 3.265 -0.526 3.577 0.719 4.396 1.515 4.201 
Dummy 1933 -6.312 4.001 -9.449 6.046 -6.907 4.682 -5.617 4.539 
Dummy 1934 -10.467 5.41 -15.411 10.64 -11.769* 6.31 -10.115* 6.142 
May*1931 dummy         
June * 1931 dummy         
May * 1933 dummy 0.494 0.444 0.695 0.561 0.373 0.547 0.639 0.542 
June * 1933 dummy 0.38 0.253 0.521 0.388 0.328 0.365 0.616 0.362 
May 1933 cereals 0.079 0.526 -0.067 0.655 0.409 0.57 0.143 0.548 
June 1933 cereals -0.121 0.393 -0.197 0.523 -0.152 0.38 -0.095 0.362 
November*1931 dummy 0.16 0.348 0.066 0.396 0.233 0.372 0.471 0.455 
November*1933 dummy 0.397 0.334 0.592 0.516 0.476 0.433 0.514 0.414 
Panel level variance component     -1.393  -1.719  
Standard deviation     0.498  0.423  
Proportion of total variance 
contributed by the panel level 
component (rho) 
    0.199  0.152  
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0 
Chi-squared 
    15.02***  9.48***  
N 7643  7643  7643  7643  
Wald Chi squared 2718***  7491***  62.94***  67.99***  
Log Likelihood     -268.5  -284.81  
*** significantly different from 0 at the 1 % level; ** significantly different from 0 at the 5 % level; * significantly different from 0 at the 10 % level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 
Effects of Socialist mayors on the probability of striking, 1931-1933.  
Coefficients from random effects probit model. 
 All available elections Sample of closely contested 
elections 
STRIKES UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR 
Socialist Mayor=1 0.022 0.221  -1.004* 0.603 
Socialist mayor * post 
November 1933 election 
0.242 0.262 0.607 0.477 
N 3470  819  
COLLECTIVE TRESPASSING UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR UNADJUSTED 
COEFF 
STD ERROR 
Socialist Mayor =1  -0.132 0.391 n.a.  
Socialist mayor * post 
November 1933 election 
-0.145 0.63 n.a.  
N 3470    
 Note: * statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 
Probability of striking according to month. 
Baseline probabilities for town with continuous variables at their means, in province of Córdoba in 1932, capital of judicial district, with 
a union in 1916 and no train station. 
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Notes: own calculations using coefficients in random effects probit regression [5] in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
MAP	  1	  Map 1. Regions and provinces in Spain. 
Source:  http://soymapas.com/category/mapa-mudos/page/6, name of provinces and regions added using Gimp 2.6. 
 
 
 
	  	  
	  
	  
	  
 
